May 01, 2005
The secret Downing Street
memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES
ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-
General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis
Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan,
Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister
on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further
copies should be made. It should be shown
only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and
latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough
and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military
action. Saddam was worried and expected an
attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their
neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew
that regular army morale was poor. Real support for
Saddam among the public was probably narrowly
based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There
was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified
by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on
the Iraqi regime's record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after
military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief
CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August
and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US
troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move
up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90
days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment
to Kuwait).
The secret Downing Street
memo
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES
ONLY
DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-
General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis
Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan,
Alastair Campbell
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister
on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further
copies should be made. It should be shown
only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and
latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough
and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military
action. Saddam was worried and expected an
attack, probably by air and land, but he was not
convinced that it would be immediate or
overwhelming. His regime expected their
neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew
that regular army morale was poor. Real support for
Saddam among the public was probably narrowly
based.
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There
was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action
was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified
by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the
intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on
the Iraqi regime's record. There was little
discussion in Washington of the aftermath after
military action.
CDS said that military planners would brief
CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August
and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were:
(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US
troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move
up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90
days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment
to Kuwait).
(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3
x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an
Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the
air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with
basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either
option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options for
UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three
SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in
addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to
40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern
Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had
already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure
on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but
he thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the
timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this
with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that
Bush had made up his mind to take military action,
even if the timing was not yet decided. But the
case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his
neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than
that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work
up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back
in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help
with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for
regime change was not a legal base for military
action. There were three possible legal bases: selfdefence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the
base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three
years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big
difference politically and legally if Saddam refused
to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and
WMD were linked in the sense that it was the
regime that was producing the WMD. There were
different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran.
If the political context were right, people would
support regime change. The two key issues were
whether the military plan worked and whether we
had the political strategy to give the military plan
the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if
the US battleplan was workable. The military were
continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if
Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did
not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not
go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that
it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy,
there could be US/UK differences. Despite US
resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball
with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow
the inspectors back in only when he thought the
threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime
Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would
need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
in the US did not think it worth going down the
ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime
Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK
would take part in any military action. But we
needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the
US military that we were considering a range of
options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question
of whether funds could be spent in preparation for
this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details
of the proposed military campaign and possible UK
contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime
Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and
discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on
the positions of countries in the region especially
Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a
full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the
Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this followup
work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an
Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the
air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous
option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with
basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either
option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also
important, but less vital. The three main options for
UK involvement were:
(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three
SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in
addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to
40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern
Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi
divisions.
The Defence Secretary said that the US had
already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure
on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but
he thought the most likely timing in US minds for
military action to begin was January, with the
timeline beginning 30 days before the US
Congressional elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this
with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that
Bush had made up his mind to take military action,
even if the timing was not yet decided. But the
case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his
neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than
that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work
up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back
in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help
with the legal justification for the use of force.
The Attorney-General said that the desire for
regime change was not a legal base for military
action. There were three possible legal bases: selfdefence,
humanitarian intervention, or UNSC
authorisation. The first and second could not be the
base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three
years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.
The Prime Minister said that it would make a big
difference politically and legally if Saddam refused
to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and
WMD were linked in the sense that it was the
regime that was producing the WMD. There were
different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran.
If the political context were right, people would
support regime change. The two key issues were
whether the military plan worked and whether we
had the political strategy to give the military plan
the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if
the US battleplan was workable. The military were
continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if
Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did
not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on
Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not
go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that
it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK
interests converged. But on the political strategy,
there could be US/UK differences. Despite US
resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball
with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow
the inspectors back in only when he thought the
threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime
Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would
need to decide this early. He cautioned that many
in the US did not think it worth going down the
ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime
Minister to set out the political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK
would take part in any military action. But we
needed a fuller picture of US planning before we
could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the
US military that we were considering a range of
options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question
of whether funds could be spent in preparation for
this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details
of the proposed military campaign and possible UK
contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime
Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and
discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on
the positions of countries in the region especially
Turkey, and of the key EU member states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a
full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the
Attorney-General would consider legal advice with
FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this followup
work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT
(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
If people only knew the facts, they would not be fighting for the 'RIGHT' to be screwed over.
Time will tell all the Truth.
VT
Time will tell all the Truth.
VT
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